BREN CARLILL: What Australia’s moralising on the Middle East gets so wrong

With all the bad news emanating out of the Middle East, it’s easy to understand why a small — but highly significant — good thing has been largely overlooked. Israel and Lebanon are holding direct peace talks.

The two countries have been in an official state of war since Lebanon declared it in 1948, so the prospect that they could come to a peace agreement — or even a permanent understanding to end cross-border violence — clearly matters.

But they also matter for a less obvious reason: they are in Australia’s interests.

Too often, Australian commentary on the Middle East amounts to moralism without strategy — vague language about peace, de-escalation and restraint, with little attention paid to what actually drives conflict.

This needs to change.

Australia has a direct interest in a weaker Iran-led axis, in greater stability in the eastern Mediterranean, in the protection of global trade and energy routes, and in reducing the risk of another regional escalation that sends economic and political shockwaves far beyond the Middle East.

That is why these talks matter for Australia. But we need to be honest about what they are really about.

The issue is not some ancient blood feud. Nor is it merely a technical border disagreement. The core problem is that Lebanon has, for decades, housed an armed movement more powerful than the state.

Hezbollah has compromised Lebanon, intimidated it and, at key moments, overridden it. Hezbollah’s actions are not a misplaced expression of Lebanese patriotism, but rather the sharp end of Iranian regional power.

That is why long-term peace between Israel and Lebanon has remained elusive. Not because the two countries are destined to fight forever, but because one of them has never fully controlled its own side of the border.

That is also why these talks are happening now. Both Hezbollah and Iran have been significantly weakened. Space has opened up that did not exist before. The question is whether Lebanon has the willingness and capacity to take advantage of this space.

Many Lebanese clearly want to. Large parts of Lebanese society have long understood that Hezbollah’s claim to be defending Lebanon was a fiction that came with a terrible price — war, paralysis, ruined sovereignty and a national future subordinated to Tehran’s interests. One need not be pro-Israel to see that. One need only be pro-Lebanon.

Canberra should stop speaking as though a ceasefire, in and of itself, is the solution. A ceasefire can be useful. It can save lives and create political space. But a ceasefire that leaves Hezbollah armed is not a peace settlement — it is an intermission.

The central issue is Hezbollah’s disarmament and the establishment of the Lebanese state’s monopoly on force. Everything else is secondary.

Obviously, Australia cannot determine the outcome. But middle powers can influence situations when they use their voice clearly, align it with serious diplomacy and consistently reinforce the right principles.

Australia should therefore do three things.

First, it should publicly and repeatedly support direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, not as an end in themselves, but as a means of strengthening Lebanese sovereignty and reducing Hezbollah’s room to manoeuvre.

Second, it should say, clearly and repeatedly, that Lebanese sovereignty is incompatible with Hezbollah remaining an independent armed force. For too long, too much diplomatic language has obscured that basic truth. If the Lebanese state does not control questions of war and peace, then Lebanon is not fully sovereign. It is that simple.

Third, Australia should back international efforts that strengthen the Lebanese state rather than cling to the fiction that Hezbollah can remain armed indefinitely without condemning Lebanon to more war. That means practical support for Lebanese institutions willing to assert state authority, and real support for diplomatic arrangements that treat Hezbollah’s military autonomy as the problem to be solved, not the reality to be accommodated.

There is also a broader strategic point here. Australia claims, not without reason, to be a middle power that can punch above its weight. A serious middle power does not merely call for calm. It distinguishes between the forces that strengthen states and the forces that hollow them out. It recognises the difference between sovereignty and militia rule. And it understands that not all “stability” is equal: some forms merely freeze the conditions for the next war.

If these talks help Lebanon recover sovereignty from Hezbollah, Australia should want them to succeed and should say so plainly. If they merely produce another temporary arrangement that leaves Hezbollah armed and Iran’s influence intact, they will change very little.

That is the test. And that is how Australia’s approach to them should be judged.

Dr Bren Carlill is the Director of Special Projects at the Australia Israel and Jewish Affairs Council.