THE ECONOMIST: Who wrangled the best trade deal from Donald Trump?

In recent weeks President Donald Trump has struck new trade deals with Argentina and India. Both countries have obtained partial relief from tariffs by making it easier for American firms to sell goods to their citizens in return. The backlash from those citizens was swift. Indian farmers’ unions branded the deal a “total surrender”; an opposition politician warned that India risked becoming “a dumping ground”. Such charges have become familiar. France’s former prime minister described the EU’s deal with America as an act of “submission”.

Though Mr Trump has fallen far short of the “90 deals in 90 days” his administration promised last April, he has signed a flurry of them. America has concluded five final reciprocal trade deals — including with Cambodia, Malaysia and Argentina — plus around a dozen looser “frameworks” with partners such as the EU and India.

These are deliberately thin; fewer than eight pages long, they go heavy on vague statements, such as that the countries “intend to discuss” things. None has congressional approval, binding enforcement or a clear dispute-settlement mechanism. Even so, they have set new terms of access to America’s market. Who came out ahead?

Cambodia and Malaysia paid the highest price. Lacking size, leverage and credible alternative markets, both rushed agreements through on the margins of a summit in October. In return for new reciprocal tariff rates of 19 per cent and exemptions for many exports, both countries offered sweeping concessions. Some were conventional, such as scrapping tariffs on American goods and easing sanitary rules.

Others went much further. Malaysia agreed to mirror American export controls against “non-market” third countries (meaning China) and consult Mr Trump before signing digital-trade deals with others.

Moreover, America can terminate the pact if Malaysia strikes another deal it dislikes. One former Malaysian politician called it “the worst agreement” Malaysia has entered since independence in 1957. Even Malaysia’s current trade minister has spoken of “unfair” clauses.

Those with more leverage over America — including the EU, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — conceded less. This group controls everything from industrial supply chains to advanced semiconductor chips, and so could negotiate more.

Each faces reciprocal tariffs of 15 per cent and secured meaningful relief from levies on goods including cars, drugs and semiconductors. In exchange, they agreed to eliminate many industrial and agricultural tariffs and lower non-tariff barriers on American vehicles. They also made eye-catching pledges — like the EU’s to buy $US750 billion-worth ($1.05t) of American energy, or Taiwan’s to invest $US250b there — which are unlikely to be fulfilled.

India, too, negotiated a middling deal from a position of limited dependence, offering targeted liberalisation rather than sweeping concessions. It secured a reciprocal tariff rate of 18 per cent, plus conditional exemptions for generic drugs, and aircraft and car parts. In return it will ease market access for American industrial goods and some politically sensitive exports, such as genetically modified corn products.

The countries to obtain the greatest access to America’s market, while surrendering the least, were Argentina and Britain. Both received capped tariff rates at 10 per cent with big carve-outs, such as being able to sell large quantities of untariffed beef to Americans. British firms can sell 100,000 cars a year at the 10 per cent rate, and secured cuts to levies on car parts and steel. In return, both countries expanded American firms’ access to their markets, yet avoided the sweeping obligations imposed elsewhere.

For those who view trade as a zero-sum game, with deficits signifying failure and surpluses success, Mr Trump has been the clear winner. America has obtained greater market access for its exporters, promises to dismantle non-tariff barriers and vast investment pledges.

Nearly every agreement also prescribes co-operation on export controls and unfair practices by third countries, meaning China. Many also restrict digital-services taxes and extend the reach of American regulation overseas.

Yet that mercantilist thinking — exports good, imports bad — is a poor way to keep score. America’s higher tariffs impose costs on consumers and reduce competition. Its trading partners, by contrast, are being forced to open up. Indonesia is easing nickel-export restrictions; India is easing agricultural trade; and the EU is lowering both tariff and non-tariff barriers. These changes will outlast the deals themselves. In the end, the countries that made the largest concessions may be the ones which gain the most.